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IntroductIon
In its time in power, which is shortly to end, the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition intro-
duced key legislative changes enabling a further transformation of the energy 
sector (referred to as ‘Energiewende’), which provide for a total restructuring 
of the German energy system by 2050. The term Energiewende (energy trans-
formation) became popular in Germany in 2011, when, in response to social 
protests following the disaster in the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, the 
government announced a plan to accelerate the decommissioning of nuclear 
plants and began to use this term to popularise an energy strategy whose main 
aim was to develop renewable sources of energy1. The long-term goals of Ener-
giewende include reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95% by 2050 and 
increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the consumption of pri-
mary energy to 60% (from the present 13%). In the future, green electricity is set 
to replace not only the electricity produced in conventional power plants, but 
also natural gas used for heating and oil used in transport. However, it should 
be remembered that the roots of the Energiewende concept reach back to the 
1970s and to the protests against the development of the nuclear energy sector 
in Germany. The German state has offered comprehensive support for the devel-
opment of renewable sources of energy since the end of the 1990s. The energy 
transformation strategy enjoys considerable support from society; moreover, 
all political parties support it and their programme differences solely concern 
the pace of introducing this strategy and not the goal itself. Energiewende has 
become an element of German identity and an important component of a posi-
tive image for Germany. Thereby, the strategy is of major importance for Ger-
man politics.
Despite the fact that Energiewende is a major priority for the government, 
the implementation of this strategy is encountering various problems, as well 
as resistance from the traditional energy lobby. It is also frequently confronted 
by politicians’ fears of introducing overly radical changes. The electricity mar-
ket is where the spread of renewable energy sources is the most rapid. In the 
previous government term, the main goal was to reduce the costs of subsidising 
renewable sources of energy in electricity generation. It seems that the reforms 
have brought the expected result and the government has managed to stop the 
spiral of increasing costs of support for renewable energy sources (RES). Due 
1 For more see A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż (ed.), Germany’s energy transformation: difficult 
beginnings, OSW Report, December 2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
report/2012-12-06/germanys-energy-transformation-difficult-beginnings
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to a favourable pace of investment, the decommissioning of nuclear plants 
is proceeding according to plan and it is almost certain that all nuclear plants 
in Germany will have been shut down by the end of 2022. However, it is still 
not known how and when Germany will be shutting down the most emission-
generating brown coal-fired power plants. The greatest challenge is posed by the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions because, due to an increase in electric-
ity generation in brown coal-fired power plants and an increase in the use 
of fuels in the transport sector, the level of greenhouse gas emissions is almost 
equal to that recorded in 2011. Moreover, Germany is developing its electric 
car sector at a slower pace than expected. In 2017, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
admitted that the previously announced goal involving one million electric cars 
by 2020 is unrealistic. 
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theses 
• The German government is presenting the national strategy for energy 
transformation as a success. This strategy is also being promoted abroad. In 
its official communications, the government is drawing attention to a num-
ber of positive aspects that energy transformation brings to the country 
as a whole, when it comes to both security and environmental protection. 
It is emphasised that, for Germany, renewable energy sources (RES) mean 
greater security of energy supplies and economic security, in that they 
guarantee low and stable energy prices in the future. A narrative involving 
Germany maintaining its technological lead in the field of green energy-
generating technologies is also present. At the same time, the government 
admits that there are certain sector-specific problems surrounding the 
transformation, such as high electricity prices and stagnation in the re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, these challenges have 
no impact on the stance Germany expresses in European and international 
forums or on the positive narrative regarding energy transformation itself. 
• Maintaining energy costs that would be acceptable for the economy will 
continue to pose a major challenge for the new government. Continued 
increases in the price of electricity would mainly affect small and medi-
um companies, most of which are not entitled to discounts when buying 
electricity, unlike companies from the energy-intensive industrial sec-
tor. A major hike in electricity prices would also constitute a problem for 
low income households, and in the long run would entail an increase in 
the price of most utilities and consumer goods. In 2014 and 2016, the Min-
istry for Economic Affairs pushed through two amendments to the law 
concerning renewable sources of energy, which dramatically reduced the 
amount of subsidies offered to RES, and consequently slowed down the rise 
in electricity prices paid by consumers. Whereas in 2012 the average cost of 
subsidy for RES was 18.2 cents/kWh, in 2016 it dropped to 16.6 cents/kWh, 
and the forecast for 2017 is 16 cents/kWh. The most significant drop was 
recorded for solar energy: from 35 cents/kWh in 2012 to 29.2 cents/kWh 
in 2016. Despite this drop, the cost of subsidising RES remains high – in 
2016 producers of green energy received subsidies worth 29 billion euros 
that came from obligatory fees to support RES. The reform of the system 
for subsidising RES has resulted in a marked change in the market. Invest-
ments in photovoltaic power dropped from an average of 7 GW annually in 
2010–2012 to 1.5 GW in 2015–2016. The negative impact of this change was 
that companies were going bankrupt and the number of jobs in the solar 
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energy sector was diminished. In 2010–2015 alone, the number of individ-
uals employed in the solar energy sector dropped by 71% from 107 800 to 
31 600. 
• For years, the permanent challenges for Germany’s energy and climate pol-
icy have been the extension of transmission networks and the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. So far, the extension of electricity networks 
has been progressing at a slower pace than originally planned. From the 
1800 km of power lines foreseen in the law, to date only 650 km have been 
constructed and building permits have been issued for another 850 km. 
The construction of any of the three key energy highways (direct current 
high voltage lines) linking the north with the south of the country has not 
yet started. These highways are intended to transmit electricity from off-
shore wind farms, to replace a major portion of what is being produced by 
nuclear plants.  
• The future of Germany’s coal energy sector is still unknown. The present 
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government has not taken any stance on the sched-
ule of decommissioning coal-fired plants, which is of key importance for 
Germany if it wishes to meet the goals of greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion. Similarly, no meeting of coal industry representatives with the gov-
ernment has taken place under the announced ‘round table’ regarding 
coal phase-out. Germany’s biggest problem is brown coal – in 2016 23.1% 
of electricity was generated from it. In 2000–2015, electricity generation 
from brown coal dropped by a mere 2%, whereas it increased by 6% com-
pared to 2010. In 2015, brown coal-fired power plants generated over 50% 
of CO2 emissions recorded in the German energy sector (around 20% of 
Germany’s total CO2 emissions). The closing down of brown coal mines and 
brown coal-fired plants will trigger protests by trade unions and reluc-
tance on the part of those federal states in which these mines are located 
(90% of Germany’s production comes from North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Brandenburg). However, nationwide, around 80% of society support the 
plan to eliminate coal burning in power plants by 2030.  
• The new government will have to tackle the issue of changes within the 
automotive market. Germany’s emissions from transport have barely de-
clined since 1990, and diesel cars, which were expected to help reduce 
emissions, have in recent years fallen into disfavour with Germans. Ger-
man companies had tried to implement a strategy of introducing so-called 
‘clean diesel’ cars on the market. However, it failed due to various disclosed 
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cases of cheating in emission tests. Following this scandal, automotive com-
panies lost their credibility both in Germany and abroad. At the same time, 
the German automotive industry is lobbying against the so-called energy 
transformation in transport (German: Verkehrswende). The powerful influ-
ence of this sector results from the fact that it employs around one million 
individuals and is of key importance for the state of the German economy. 
As a consequence, Germany’s greenhouse gas emissions in the transport 
sector have continued to rise over recent years and the German automo-
tive sector is rather unlikely to deliver low- and zero-emission cars to the 
market.  
• As far as continued energy sector reforms are concerned, there are two 
conflicting opinions. The main challenges which the sceptics (representa-
tives of the German industry) cite are the need to reduce costs and also to 
implement energy and climate policy goals as cheaply as possible. Energy 
transformation enthusiasts (the environmental protection and new tech-
nologies lobby) on the other hand, are looking for new ways to finance the 
development of RES without the need to increase the electricity price paid 
by recipients. Electoral programmes devised by political parties contain 
two contrasting concepts: the Green Party wants to increase the share of 
RES in electricity generation to 100% by 2030 and to introduce a plan for 
decommissioning conventional power plants. The liberal party (FDP), for its 
part, wants to cut RES subsidies completely and to foster competition among 
all electricity generation sources. Germany’s biggest political parties, CDU/
CSU and SPD as well as Die Linke, do not propose any significant changes to 
the present energy policy and instead they support the plan to achieve the 
formerly adopted goals using presently available policy instruments. 
10
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
1/
20
17
I. The expansIon of renewable sources of energy 
The development of renewable sources of energy in the electricity generation sec-
tor has been the biggest success of Energiewende to date. In 2000–2016, the pro-
duction of electricity from renewable sources recorded a five-fold increase from 
36 TWh to 192 TWh2. The largest increase has occurred since 2011, when the deci-
sion to decommission nuclear plants was announced and the government popu-
larised the idea of Energiewende, or the transformation of the energy sector based 
on renewable energy sources (RES). This development was possible only due to the 
policy of support for RES development. The most important instrument was the feed-
in-tariff, which guarantees that producers may sell ‘green electricity’ at a price that 
is several times higher than the wholesale electricity price. The difference between 
the wholesale price and the guaranteed price would be covered by recipients as the 
so-called RES fee. Due to a relatively large internal market, an attractive system 
of subsidies (including a guaranteed price for the supply of electricity for 20 years), 
and political support for the development of RES, Germany has become the world’s 
biggest producer and exporter of RES technologies, and since around 2010 even the 
largest market in terms of the volume of investments. In 2016, 29% of electricity was 
generated from RES. Thereby, green energy has become a major source of power for 
the electricity and energy network, next to coal-fired, gas-fired and nuclear plants 
(nuclear plants are due to be decommissioned by the end of 2022). 
chart 1. Electricity generation in 2016 (in TWh) 
RES – 29.0%
Anthracite
– 17.2%
Natural gas – 12.4% 
Oil – 0.9%
Other – 4.2%
Lignite – 23.1%
Nuclear energy
– 13.0%
Hydroelectric energy ~ 3.2%
Renewable energy sources – 29%, including:
Biomass ~ 7.0%
Photovoltaic energy ~ 5.9%
Waste ~ 0.9%
Wind energy ~ 11.9%
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Do-
ssier/erneuerbare-energien.html 
2 Erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland Daten zur Entwicklung im Jahr 2016, Federal Office for the 
Environment, March 2017, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/376/pub-
likationen/erneuerbare_energien_in_deutschland_daten_zur_entwicklung_im_jahr_2016.pdf 
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The biggest problem faced by the energy transformation is the increase in the 
price of electricity paid by individual consumers. High energy prices are less 
burdensome for industrial consumers because they are entitled to discounts 
or have their own power generation equipment.
Around 2009 it became clear that the existing system of subsidising RES may 
lead to anomalies in the energy market: in a country with frequently cloudy 
skies, the most expensive solar power stations with several times more capac-
ity were installed instead of cheaper wind farms, and an unprecedented over-
supply of electricity began to appear on the energy market. This caused a drop 
in wholesale electricity prices and subsequently resulted in traditional energy 
generating companies recording financial losses. At the same time, consumers 
continued to pay more for electricity: in 2008–2012 the annual cost of subsidis-
ing RES increased more than twofold: from around 9 billion euros to around 
21 billion euros annually. In 2015, the cost of subsidies rose to 27.5 billion euros, 
in 2016 it is expected to reach around 29.2 billion euros annually, and in 2017 – 
to 30 billion euros3. The share of the so-called RES fee in electricity bills for indi-
vidual recipients rose from around 5% in 2008 to around 20% in 2015. In recent 
years, the increase in the cost of subsidies has eased, yet it has not been halted. 
chart 2. The cost of subsidising RES in 2016–2017 (in millions euros)
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Source: http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/EE/Navigation/DE/Recht-Politik/Das_EEG/DatenFakten/
daten-und-fakten.html 
3 A publication by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy entitled “EEG 
in Zahlen: Vergütungen, Differenzkosten und EEG-Umlage 2000 bis 2017”, Berlin 2016.
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The rising costs of subsidising RES automatically translate into higher elec-
tricity bills. In 2016, an average household using 4000 kWh (kilowatt-hours) 
of energy paid around 1097 euros annually for electricity, including a so-called 
RES fee of around 219 euros (6.35 cents/kWh). For comparison, in 2006 the 
bill was 771 euros4, including an RES fee of around 35 euros (0.88 cents/kWh). 
Numerous politicians and experts have argued that the acceptable upper limit 
of costs of subsidising RES paid by consumers has already been breached many 
times5. In the previous government term there was a halt in the increase of the 
price of electricity paid by individual recipients. In 2016, the average electricity 
price paid by households (gross price) was lower than in 20136 (see Appendix). 
The respite in the electricity price surge was possible due to a drop in the whole-
sale price of electricity. This, in turn, happened because even though the costs 
of subsidising RES continue to rise, this has occurred at a much slower pace. 
This has been down to the reform of the system for subsidising RES. First, the 
feed-in-tariffs for the production of electricity, specified in the law (the 2012 and 
2014 amended RES laws) were gradually reduced, then open tenders for the 
production of electricity from RES were introduced (the 2016 amended RES 
law). The reforms bore fruit – in 2011–2014, the so-called RES fee rose by 76% 
(from 3.53 cents/kWh to 6.24 cents/kWh), whereas after the law was amended, 
in 2014–2017, the RES fee rose by 11% (to 6.88 cents/kWh). Due to a drop in the 
cost of RES technology, electricity consumers paid less in ‘green electricity’ sub-
sidies: while in 2012 the average cost of subsidy for RES was 18.2 cents/kWh, 
in 2016 it stood at 16.6 cents/kWh, and the forecast for 2017 is 16 cents/kWh. 
The most striking drop in the cost of subsidy involved solar power: it fell from 
35 cents/kWh in 2012 to 29.2 cents/kWh in 20167. The latest tender results sug-
gest that the support for RES will soon be eliminated completely. In the April 
2017 tender, a bid was approved to build a 900 MW offshore wind farm that will 
4 Tarife.de, Deutsche arbeiten jährlich 65 Stunden für Strom, 27 April 2017, http://www.tar-
ife.de/nachrichten/deutsche-arbeiten-jaehrlich-65-stunden-fuer-strom_208628.html 
5 The acceptable upper limit of RES subsidy fees paid by German recipients was mentioned 
by politicians and lobbyists several times, for example in 2010, 2014 and 2016. Source: Michael 
Fuchs (a CDU deputy), Bundestag, 12 May 2014 https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/tex-
tarchiv/2014/interview_fuchs/276564; Holger Schwannecke, secretary general of the Ger-
man Crafts Association, 14 October 2016, https://www.zdh.de/index.php?id=29925; Die 
Schmerzgrenze ist erreicht, Handelsblatt, 2 July 2010, http://www.handelsblatt.com/poli-
tik/deutschland/solarfoerderung-die-schmerzgrenze-ist-erreicht/3479404.html
6 In 2016, the average electricity price paid by households was 28.69 cents/kWh. Source: 
Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken (2016), BDEW, Berlin, 18 Feb-
ruary 2016, p. 56.
7 A publication by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy entitled “EEG 
in Zahlen: Vergütungen, Differenzkosten und EEG-Umlage 2000 bis 2017”, Berlin 2016.
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require no subsidies and will rely solely on market prices8. This set a precedent 
in Germany and formed part of a trend towards a drop in the cost of energy 
generation from RES.
The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition has also tackled the issues regarding investment 
in new renewable power stations. In 2012, an annual limit for installing new 
photovoltaic (solar) plants was introduced. In 2014, it was expanded to include 
other types pf RES as well. As a consequence, Germany’s energy sector has 
become more stable and predictable. On the other hand, this administrative 
limit has had a negative impact on the financial standing of companies operat-
ing in the photovoltaic sector, with several of them becoming insolvent9. At pre-
sent, the photovoltaic market is stagnating. In 2016, photovoltaic plants with 
1.5 GW power were installed, in 2015 – 1.5 GW, in 2014 – 1.9 GW, whereas in the 
peak years of 2010–2012 over 7 GW were installed annually. At present, newly 
installed photovoltaic capacity is lower than the limit specified in the law, i.e. 
2.5 GW per year. Critics of the government argue that this means that Ger-
many is not implementing the provisions of the energy transformation quickly 
enough. On the other hand, it was precisely this drop in the number of newly 
installed expensive photovoltaic plants combined with an increase in the num-
ber of newly installed cheaper wind farms that made it possible to make savings 
in the RES subsidy system.  
8 R. Bajczuk, Niemcy: Pierwsza farma wiatrowa bez dotacji, Analizy OSW, 26 April 2017, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-04-26/niemcy-pierwsza-farma-wia-
trowa-bez-dotacji 
9 A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, K. Mazur, The expensive energy revolution in Germany. The imple-
mentation of the Energiewende is behind schedule, OSW Commentary, 10 May 2012, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-10/expensive-energy-revolu-
tion-germany-implementation-energiewende
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chart 3. Annual increase in installed RES power in 2005–2015 (in MW) 
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Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
The most recent legal amendment adopted by the Bundestag in August 2016 was 
inspired by the need to reduce the so-called RES fee. It also implemented Euro-
pean Commission guidelines on state aid for renewable energy-related pur-
poses10. The law has changed the philosophy of how the state subsidises RES: 
producers of ‘green electricity’ will continue to receive a guaranteed rate for the 
production of electricity, but the amount of the guaranteed price will be set each 
time in a tender. The purpose of this change to the law is to create the conditions 
for fostering the implementation of a subsequent stage of energy transforma-
tion, with the objective of increasing the share of electricity production from 
RES from 30% in 2015 to 40–45% in 202511. Moreover, the reform provides for 
the inclusion of energy generation from renewable sources in the energy mar-
ket – until now, electricity was being generated from RES with no consideration 
for the actual demand. Both the parliamentary opposition and the German RES 
lobby voted against this amendment, as they rightly feared that if it does not 
specify the prices for the supply of electricity, the sector will be less attractive 
for new investors.
10 R. Bajczuk, Niemcy: reforma rynku energii, Analizy OSW, 13 July 2016, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-07-13/niemcy-reforma-rynku-energii 
11 Press releases by the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, https://www.bmwi.de/Redak-
tion/DE/Artikel/Energie/eeg-2017-start-in-die-naechste-phase-der-energiewende.html 
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II. The debaTe on The fuTure of energIewende 
In Germany, the development of RES and the energy transformation strategy 
are the subject of a major dispute in political, academic and economic circles. 
There is a general agreement as to the general thrust of energy policy, i.e. the 
promotion of renewable energy sources and emissions reduction. However, 
the dispute concerns the pace and the sources for funding of new investments. 
The debate revolves around two conflicting approaches: on one side, representa-
tives of business circles (chambers of commerce and industry, think tanks and 
foundations associated with big enterprises) and bodies responsible for the 
state’s financial stability (the Antitrust Committee, the Federal Audit Office) 
criticise the excessively high costs of Energiewende12. Their adversaries in the 
debate, non-governmental organisations dealing with environmental protec-
tion, as well as companies from the new technology sector, support a rapid pace 
of investment in renewable energy sources. This division largely results from 
the divergent interests of various consumers of energy. While the relatively 
affluent German society means that households and the service sector can 
afford high electricity bills, the industrial sector, which produces goods for the 
global market and competes with producers from all over the world, cannot 
afford to pay for electricity much more than what its competitors pay. Accord-
ing to Eurostat data, the average price of electricity paid by industrial users 
in Germany is only slightly lower than the EU average price and is higher than 
the price of electricity applicable in neighbouring states: the Czech Republic and 
Poland, as well as France, the Netherlands, Austria and the Nordic countries13. 
When it comes to retail prices, German consumers pay Europe’s second highest 
energy bills, after Danish consumers.
Think tanks associated with the industrial sector, including the Cologne-based 
Economy Institute (IW Kӧln) and the organisation called Initiative Neue Sozi-
ale Marktwirtschaft (Initiative New Social Market Economy), propose imple-
menting a reform of the RES subsidy system and reducing the system’s costs14, 
12 According to the Federal Audit Office (a counterpart of the Polish Supreme Audit Office), 
the government has to control the expenses associated with energy transformation and 
pay greater attention to possible strategy funding options and to the consequences for the 
security of energy supplies and the operation of the electricity and energy system. Source: 
A. Mihm, Bundesrechnungshof kritisiert undurchsichtige Energiewende, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 January 2017. 
13 Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/database 
14 E. Chrischilles, H. Bardt, Fünf Jahre nach Fukushima Eine Zwischenbilanz der Ener-
giewende, Cologne 2016; INSM press release, 10 October 2016, EEG & Co. treiben Ener-
16
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so as to provide breathing space for the economy. This group of lobbyists sup-
ports a technologically neutral subsidy system that would be cheaper than 
the present system (in which specific technologies do not compete with each 
other). According to IW Kӧln, even after the amendment of the August 2016 RES 
law, which reduces the level of subsidies offered, the costs of financing RES 
will continue to rise15 – by 2025 the annual cost of subsidising RES will rise 
by around 3.3–6.9 billion euros annually, which means that consumers will pay 
an additional 24.8 to 32.9 billion euros annually. For an average household, the 
annual sum of fees for RES will then rise from 222 euros annually to around 
416 euros in 2025. According to INSM, the costs of energy transformation will 
rise by 2025 as well and the total amount of subsidies for RES calculated from 
2000 onwards will be 520 billion euros16.
Proponents of the fast-track implementation of the German energy strategy, 
for example representatives of the Institute for the German Economy in Ber-
lin, and also the green technologies lobby (for instance, the Federal Associa-
tion of Renewable Energy Generation), argue that what should be corrected 
is not so much the very philosophy of subsidising the development of RES as the 
efficiency of the present system. The proposed reforms of the present system 
focus on solutions to reduce the costs of the RES subsidy system and on seek-
ing new sources of funding. For example, they provide for reducing electricity 
bills, so that the development of RES would burden consumers to a lesser extent. 
In the proposal submitted by the Federal Association for New Energy Industry 
(German: Bundesverband Neue Energiewirtschaft)17, the development of RES 
is not financed from an additional levy included in electricity bills, as is the case 
at present, but through an additional charge imposed on all conventional energy 
sources, including petrol and diesel fuel. In this way, the share of the so-called 
RES fee in the electricity bill is to be reduced from the present level of over 20% 
to 6–8%. The main goal of this reform would be to enable the so-called integra-
tion of other energy sectors (German: Sektorkopplung), by making it possible 
to use electricity as a source of primary energy to generate fuels (for example 
giewendekosten auf 520 Milliarden Euro, http://www.insm.de/insm/Presse/Pressemel-
dungen/Pressemeldung-Studie-EEG.html
15 E. Chrischilles, IW-Pressemitteilung Nr. 64, 5 October 2016.
16 INSM press release, 10 October 2016, EEG & Co. treiben Energiewendekosten auf 520 Milli-
arden Euro, http://www.insm.de/insm/Presse/Pressemeldungen/Pressemeldung-Studie-
EEG.html
17 BNE press release, 10 October 2016, Änderung der EEG-Umlagebasis bringt Sektorkop-
plung voran, http://www.bne-online.de/de/content/bne-studie-%C3%A4nderung-der-eeg-
umlagebasis-bringt-sektorkopplung-voran
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hydrogen and methane) for the transportation and heat generation sectors. 
This, in turn, is expected to result in an acceleration of energy transformation 
in the heat generation industry and in transportation. The Federal Association 
of Renewable Energy proposes reducing the cost of energy by abolishing excise 
tax on electricity and cancelling discounts offered to industrial recipients. 
A new tax on CO2 emissions would be the source of additional budget revenues18. 
Another method of reducing the cost of RES development involves a special pur-
pose fund taking a loan which electricity consumers will repay in the future. 
This proposal was put forward by politicians from the ruling coalition. Minis-
ters of the economy of Bavaria, Ilse Aigner (CSU), and North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Garrelt Duin (SPD), propose setting the upper limit of the RES fee at 6.5 cents/
kWh. Additional costs from subsidising RES would be covered by a loan whose 
repayment would start post-2028, i.e. when the 20-year period of guaranteed 
subsidy for a major portion of RES expires. In addition, Duin proposes setting 
a 50% limit of the share of levies and fees in the price of electricity, in order 
to halt the electricity price increase – at present, levies and other fees account 
for around 55% of electricity price, and the remaining 45% are fees for energy 
transmission and distribution. Moreover, he argues that the excise tax on elec-
tricity should be abolished and the RES fee reduced19. 
18 BBE press release, 7 October 2016, BEE legt Vorschläge zur Senkung der EEG-Umlage vor, 
https://www.bee-ev.de/home/presse/mitteilungen/detailansicht/bee-legt-vorschlaege-
zur-senkung-der-eeg-umlage-vor/
19 Ökostrom-Umlage steigt auf Rekordniveau von 6,88 Cent, Die Zeit, 14 October 2016, http://
www.zeit.de/news/2016-10/14/energie-netzbetreiber-geben-hoehe-der-oekostrom-
umlage-bekannt-14053402
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III. whaT wIll The new governmenT do?
Due to the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2017, the govern-
ment is not disclosing its plans regarding further energy market reforms should 
the cost of RES development continue to rise. So far, the post-2011 increase 
in energy prices paid by consumers has not been a political issue, because the 
public reacted positively to any news regarding the development of RES and 
the decommissioning of nuclear plants. In addition, the relatively frequent (for 
German standards) amendments to the RES law have been used by the govern-
ment as an argument to show that it is tackling the current problems in energy 
policy. At present, the government officially admits that the problem of high 
energy prices paid by the service sector and the industrial sector is of major 
importance. In March 2017, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy admitted that the cost of electricity should be reduced and invited both 
consumers and producers of energy to take part in a debate over this issue20. 
It should be emphasised that back in January 2017 the then minister for eco-
nomic affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, summed up his three-year term in office and 
referred to it as a success in implementing Energiewende21.
If the most recent amendment of the RES law adopted in July 2016 fails to bring 
about a drop in the cost of energy, then another reform of the subsidy system 
will surely be implemented after the September elections to the Bundestag. 
Many different scenarios for a reform of the RES subsidy system are feasible, 
including complete cessation of the guaranteed pricing scheme for the produc-
tion of electricity from RES. According to the FAZ daily, this proposed energy 
policy reform was put forward by Christian Democrat politicians specialising 
in economic affairs in their internal debate over the party manifesto22. This 
change in the energy policy would very likely slow down the development 
of RES in the electrical energy sector. However, should a left-wing coalition 
be formed, with the intent of increasing the share of green energy in the energy 
mix as quickly as possible (the Greens propose that 100% of electricity and 
heat should be generated from RES by 2035), it would have a political man-
date to do so. At present, the relatively affluent German society supports the 
20 K. Stratmann, System am Ende, Handelsblatt, 10–12 March 2017, p. 10.
21 S. Gabriel, Energiewende als Teil eines epochalen Wandels, https://www.bundesregierung.
de/Content/DE/Namensbeitrag/2017/01/2017-01-24-gabriel-handelsblatt-journal.html 
22 CDU debattiert Ausstieg aus Ökostrom-Hilfe, FAZ, 19 January 2017, http://www.faz.net/
aktuell/wirtschaft/energiepolitik/energiewende-cdu-debattiert-ausstieg-aus-oekostrom-
hilfe-14690006.html
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fastest possible development of RES, regardless of the high costs which, when 
calculated according to purchasing power parity (not in absolute numbers), are 
merely average by European standards23. However, this unstinting support for 
energy transformation may change. The point is not the social consequences 
of high energy prices – in Germany, energy poverty is not a major problem and 
Energiewende has done nothing to change this24. A shift in social mood may 
result from a change in how society perceives and assesses the energy trans-
formation policy itself. In opinion polls conducted in May 2017, regarding the 
implementation of Energiewende, 63% of the respondents assessed the trans-
formation costs as excessively high25. Numerous experts interpret this result 
as a sign of the beginning of a decline in social approval for this strategy.
An analysis of documents and party manifestos regarding energy transforma-
tion suggests that in upcoming years the main subjects of the debate will include 
the end of coal burning (Kohleausstieg) and energy transformation in transport 
(Verkehrswende). From the government’s point of view, announcing new strate-
gies for specific sectors may be a good method of diverting society’s attention 
from other problematic issues. To date, the heat generation and transport sec-
tors have not been reformed, mainly due to resistance by the lobbies of heating 
equipment producers and car manufacturers, although this direction of change 
would be in line with the energy transformation strategy promoted since 2011. 
If in the future, due to an increase in electricity costs that would be unaccep-
table for the economy, the government had to reduce the pace of investment 
in RES, it would be able to divert voters’ attention from this fact by announc-
ing further transformations. Agriculture is one example of an area in which 
the government could announce an ecological transformation. In the autumn 
of 2016, during the debate over the Climate protection strategy by 205026, the 
23 See the surveys by TNS Emnid commissioned by the Agency for Renewable Energy Sources, 
https://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/repraesentative-umfrage-weiterhin-ruecken-
wind-fuer-erneuerbare-energien 
24 The share of energy expenses in spending on consumer goods was as follows: 1998 – 4.7%, 
2003 – 5.5%, 2008 – 6.2%, 2013 – 6.4%. In 2015, the share of electricity expenses was 18%, 
of fuel expenses – 39%, of heating expenses – 33%, and process heating (cooking) expenses – 
10%. Source: an inquiry submitted by a parliamentary deputy on 1 March 2017, http://dip21.
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/113/1811351.pdf
25 M. Fabricius, Hausbesitzer und Mieter sind die neue Hoffnung der Energiewende, Die Welt, 
18.05.2017, https://www.welt.de/finanzen/immobilien/article164680479/Hausbesitzer-
und-Mieter-sind-die-neue-Hoffnung-der-Energiewende.html
26 Germany’s climate protection strategy by 2050 (German: Klimaschutzplan 2050), http://
www.bmub.bund.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/klima-klimaschutz-download/
artikel/klimaschutzplan-2050/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=3915
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Environment Ministry promoted the idea of the ecological transformation 
of agriculture (Agrarwende), which would involve reducing the use of fertilis-
ers and promoting reduced consumption of meat and milk and a hike in the VAT 
rate on these products.
Aside from costs, another important problem Germany faces in the context 
of RES development is the extension of the transmission network. So far, this 
process has been slow and recorded multiple delays. Out of 1800 km of trans-
mission lines included in the law on expanding the energy grid, 650 km has 
actually been constructed and building permits have been issued for another 
850 km. The construction of any of the three key energy highways (direct cur-
rent high voltage lines) linking the north with the south of the country has not 
yet started. They are intended to transmit electricity from offshore wind farms, 
thereby replacing a major portion of energy produced by nuclear plants that are 
set to be decommissioned by 202227.
Germany will have to tackle the problem of emissions reduction – regardless 
of the costs of developing zero-emission energy sources standing at billions 
of euros, the emissions across Germany are not being significantly reduced. 
In 2009–2016, the emissions remained largely the same and stood at around 
906 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent28. A minor drop in the emissions from 
the electricity and energy sector was counterbalanced by increased consump-
tion of natural gas in the heat generation sector and increased use of oil in the 
transport sector. The main reason behind the stagnation of German greenhouse 
gas emissions is the situation in the transport sector (both road transport and 
aviation), where the emissions have not dropped since 1990. Another reason 
is that a relatively large amount of electricity is being generated in coal-fired 
plants29. Another problem which the new government will have to tackle 
involves the German automotive industry, which has not yet managed to adjust 
to the requirements of Germany’s climate policy. It also has a major impact 
27 R. Bajczuk, Germany: time is running out for the development of the electricity and the 
energy network, OSW Analyses, 5 October 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2016-10-05/germany-time-running-out-development-electricity-and-energy-
network
28 C. Wörlen, K. Gebauer, Kurzanalyse der nationalen Treibhausgasemissionen für das Jahr 
2016, Berlin 2017, http://www.arepoconsult.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/THG-Kurzs-
tudie_2016.pdf
29 Federal Office for the Environment, Emissionsquellen, https://www.umweltbundesamt.
de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz-energiepolitik-in-deutschland/treibhausgas-
emissionen/emissionsquellen#textpart-1
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on Germany’s energy and climate policy. Should the present climate protec-
tion policy be maintained, in the upcoming years the government will have 
to reduce emissions from transport. This, in turn, will likely have a negative 
impact on the financial results recorded by the German automotive industry 
that employs around 800 000 individuals. According to experts, the German 
automotive sector is not only lagging behind the world’s latest industry-specific 
innovations, but also it is lobbying in favour of maintaining traditional techno-
logical solutions within the automotive market30.
For the new German government, energy transformation will continue to pose 
a major challenge. Back in the early 2010s, Germany was a leader in the sector 
of renewable energy sources and low emission technologies. However, at pre-
sent, other countries – China in particular and also the United Kingdom and 
France – are equal competitors in the fight for leadership of the international 
climate policy. For German companies, they represent a genuine threat across 
an increasing number of markets.
Rafał Bajczuk 
30 J. Hilgenberg, M. Müller-Görnert, Versprochen – Gebrochen Wie die deutsche Autoin-
dustrie den Klimaschutz ignoriert, Berlin 2015, https://www.vcd.org/fileadmin/user_
upload/Redaktion/Publikationsdatenbank/Auto_Umwelt/Analyse_Modellentwicklung_
deutsche_Autoindustrie_2015.pdf
See also R. Bajczuk, The diesel scandal in the German car industry, OSW Analyses, 9 Au-
gust 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-08-09/diesel-scandal-
-german-car-industry
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APPendIX
chart 1. Electricity prices paid by individual recipients in 1998–2016 (in cents 
per kWh)
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Source: Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken (2016), BDEW, Berlin, 18. Februar 
2016, p. 56 
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chart 2. Electricity prices paid by industrial recipients in 1998–2016 (in cents 
per kWh)
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Source: Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken (2016), BDEW, Berlin, 18. Februar 
2016, p. 58
